**Example question: How convincing is property dualism? [25 marks]**

1. Intro: property dualism fails to give a convincing account of the mind because, although it is correct in saying that we have distinct mental concepts from our physical concepts, it cannot demonstrate that our mental concepts do not refer to physical properties.
2. Explain property dualism
3. Zombie argument
4. Objection: zombies are not conceivable, to argue that they are is to assume that physicalism is false but this is to assume your conclusion and therefore an example of faulty reasoning
5. This is a fair objection but the physicalist is doing the same thing, assuming that physicalism is true when making the claim that zombies are inconceivable. It seems therefore that the zombie argue is unpersuasive as your presuppositions about the nature of the mind will determine whether you accept the argument.
6. Try a different argument: Mary the Scientist
7. Objection: Mary learns acquaintance/ability knowledge so does not learn any new ***facts***
8. No, these objections don’t work.
9. Objection: There is more than one way of knowing the same fact. She does learn a new fact, but it is a new fact ***about*** the things she already knew about. This does not imply that mental properties **exist** and the disagreement between property dualists and physicalists is over what **exists**, not about how we think about what exists
10. Furthermore, this problem can be further exemplified by Ryle when he explains that property dualism commits a category mistake which leads to the conclusion that more than just physical properties exist (e.g. team spirit)
11. Therefore, since it is possible that our concepts of mental properties merely refer to physical properties, we should apply Ockham’s razor and use a physicalist account of the mind since positing the existence of mental properties adds no explanatory value.

**Example question: How convincing is philosophical behaviourism? [25 marks]**

1. Intro:
   * Behaviourism first proposed in the early 20th century to make talk of the mind scientific.
   * Science has since made great progression however and, as a result, behaviourism has been left behind.
   * Applying Ockham’s razor and translating talk of the mind into descriptions of observable physical phenomena is an appealing one, but we will need to move beyond behaviourism and adopt a type identity theory of the brain if a reductionist form of physicalism is to succeed.
2. Explain Ryle’s rejection of dualism (category mistake) and Ockham’s razor
3. Explain Hempel’s (hard) behaviourism: mental state = behaviour.
4. Objection: suppressed pain/actor show that Hempel’s version must be wrong
5. Ryle’s version of behaviourism: mental state = disposition to behaviour.
6. Objection: This ignores the phenomenological aspect of consciousness: what it feels like to experience a mental state. E.g. Putnam’s super spartans
7. Behaviourist response: There will be a difference in physiology between the super spartan who is experiencing pain and the one who is not, otherwise there would be no difference between being in pain or not!
   * Objection: This is a valid point. The difference will be a brain state which we can observe and so reducing the mental state is still possible. But it is no longer behaviourism, it is type identity theory. So behaviourism fails.
8. Objection: multiple realisability. People with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance. So we cannot make a definitive list of disposition statements that describe all the ways someone with that mental state may behave.
9. Ryle can respond that he doesn’t have to, mental concepts are still concepts of behavioural dispositions, just at a higher level of generality. E.g. someone who is scared will ***usually*** [insert behaviour] under normal (most) circumstances
   * Objection: But this doesn’t solve the problem. What makes it true that two people have the same mental state? Fear can be expressed in just about any behaviour.
   * The only way we can differentiate between people’s ‘behaviour’ is to describe their brain states when they have a certain mental state. But again, this is to abandon behaviourism and move to type identity theory.
10. Objection: Even greater issue with behaviourism = circularity. We can’t translate mental states into behavioural dispositions without referring to other mental states e.g. fear = I will run away if I am **scared** / I will remain still if I **want** to look brave to others.
    * Once again, we can solve this problem by saying that the behaviour will vary depending on certain brain states. Translating mental states as brain states doesn’t face the circularity problem: e.g. Fear = run away if brain is in particular state / remain still if brain is in certain state.
11. Type identity theory faces issues of its own but it is clear that behaviourism fails to offer a convincing theory of the mind because, when taken to its logical end, it has to convert to a type identity theory to solve the issues of multiple realisability and circularity.

**Example question: How convincing is eliminativism? [25 marks]**

1. Intro: Eliminativism is an unconvincing theory because it refuses to accept the existence of something we can be certain of: the existence of mental states. Although it is true that we could be wrong about the metaphysical nature of these mental states, we can be certain that they exist. Furthermore, I shall demonstrate that eliminativism not a coherent theory since it ultimately refutes itself.
2. Explain eliminativism, give example of caloric fluid to show how science can lead to elimination of concepts
3. Explain what Churchland thinks the alternative is: folk psychology, and why he thinks this is false.
4. Objection: we can dispute Churchland’s claim and argue that, in fact, folk psychology is the best hypothesis when trying to explain human behaviour.
5. Churchland though has a compelling point when he says that to have very different sorts of theories – folk psychology & neuroscience – explaining different aspects of the mind is unsatisfactory. We should opt for neuroscience over folk psychology
6. Objection: eliminativism denies what is so obviously true, that we have mental states. The position of reductionist physicalist theories are more reasonable as they do not deny the existence of mental states, but instead argue that we misunderstand their nature. E.g. behaviourism/type identity. There is nothing we can be more certain of than the existence of our mental states and so eliminativism is false.
7. Firstly, the eliminativist can reply but saying that our subjective certainties are not necessarily a good guide to what is true. E.g. the sun moves around the Earth.

Secondly, the Churchlands respond that it is not our beliefs/desires that need explaining, they **are** the attempted explanation of the phenomenon of the mind – a folk psychological explanation. This should be replaced by a neuroscientific explanation.

1. Objection: this is unsatisfactory because at least we can explain how we could be wrong about the relationship between the Sun and the Earth, how could we be wrong about the existence of our own beliefs, desires etc.? In fact, even if we were wrong, wouldn’t this prove we have beliefs? If we are going to deny the existence as fundamental as mental states, we are going to need enormously powerful arguments.
2. This leads to the biggest problem of eliminativism: it is self refuting. Eliminativism argues claims that there are no beliefs. But this is a belief! And it is formed in an argument to try and change my beliefs (which don’t exist)!
3. Churchland can reply The objection begs the question. It assumes that folk psychology (Intentionality) is the correct account of meaning. E.g. vital force
4. Objection: It is a *conceptual* truth that claims and arguments are ‘about’ something. This can’t be eliminated in favour of some alternative.

**Example question: How convincing is functionalism? [25 marks]**

1. Intro: despite functionalism having the great strength of not being committed to a particular metaphysical theory of the nature of the mind, it ultimately fails because it cannot adequately account for qualia.
2. Explain functionalism
3. Explain the strength that this has in not having to make metaphysical existence claims about what exists. Therefore it does not face the problem of interaction that dualist theories struggle with
4. Nor does it have to deny something which seems so obviously true to us like the elimiativists do (the certainty of our mental states)
5. It can also solve the problem of multiple realisability which plagues reductionist theories – briefly explain why behaviourism and type identity theory struggle with this – then explain why this is not an issue for functionalism
6. However, in trying to explain the mind purely in terms of functions, functionalism fails to adequately explain qualia. Explain Block’s ‘Chinese Mind’ / Mary the Scientist.
7. Response to the thought experiment you gave above
8. Inverted qualia
9. Churchland’s replies and your responses
10. Functionalism fails to account for qualia so it misses something essential about the mind. Therefore it fails as a theory.