**Metaphysics of Mind Exam Questions**

These are the terms that are likely to be asked about in a 3 mark question.

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| **Behaviourism, hard (Hempel)** | The view that statements containing mental concepts can be reduced or translated into statements about behaviour and physical states containing no mental concepts, only physical ones. |
| **Behaviourism, soft**  **(Ryle)** | The view that talk of the mind is talk of how someone does or would behave under certain conditions. However, behavioural dispositions are not reducible to a finite set of statements about how someone would behave. |
| **Category mistake** | Treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it doesn’t belong to, e.g. 'this number is heavy' commits a category mistake as numbers are not the sorts of things that can have a weight. |
| **Conceivable** | Capable of being imagined or grasped mentally without incoherence or contradiction. |
| **Consciousness** | The subjective phenomenon of awareness of the world and/or of one's mental states. |
| **Disposition** | How someone will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances: what they would do, could do, or are liable to do, in particular situations or under particular conditions, including conditions that they are not in at the moment. For example, someone who has a friendly disposition tends to smile when they are smiled at. |
| **Dualism, property** | The theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically fundamental kinds of property - mental properties and physical properties. |
| **Dualism, substance** | The theory that two kinds of substance exist, mental and physical substance. |
| **Elimination** | Ceasing to use a concept on the grounds that what it refers does not exist, e.g. the idea of ‘caloric fluid’ was eliminated by a new theory of heat in molecular motion. |
| **Eliminative materialism** | The theory that at least some of our basic mental concepts, such as consciousness or Intentionality, are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they don’t refer to anything that exists. |
| **Epiphenomenalism** | The theory that mental states and events are epiphenomena, by-products, the effects of some physical process, but with no causal influence of their own. Often combined with property dualism. |
| **Folk psychology** | A body of knowledge or theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people's behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse, e.g. 'if someone is thirsty, they will normally try to find something to drink'. |
| **Function** | A mapping from each of the possible inputs to some state to its output. The description of a state's function describes what that state does. |
| **Functionalism** | The theory that mental states are (can be reduced to) functional states, i.e. what it is to be a mental state is just to be a state with certain input and output relations to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states. |
| **Intentionality** | The property of mental states whereby they are ‘directed’ towards an ‘object’, that is they are 'about' something, e.g. the belief that Paris is the capital of France is about Paris and the desire to eat chocolate is about chocolate. |
| **Introspection** | Direct, first-personal awareness of one's own mental states. |
| **Inverted qualia** | The thought experiment that supposes that two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways, e.g. they both call the object 'red'. The argument is presented as an objection to a functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness. |
| **Machine table** | A table listing every possible combination of input and output for a machine, describing the operations of its software. |
| **Materialism** | The theory that the only substance is matter (or physical substance). Everything that exists, including the mind, depends on matter (physical substance) to exist. |
| **Mental states** | Mental phenomena that can endure over time, such as beliefs and desires. The term is sometimes used more broadly to cover mental phenomena or mental properties in general (states, processes and events). |
| **Multiple realisability** | 1) The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions.  2) The claim that one and the same mental state can have its function performed by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states. |
| **Ontologically distinct** | Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other, and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other, e.g. substance dualists claim that mind and body are ontologically distinct substances. |
| **Phenomenal consciousness** | A form of consciousness with a subjective experiential quality, as involved in perception, sensation, and emotion. Awareness of 'what it is like' to experience such mental phenomena. |
| **Phenomenal properties** | Properties of an experience that give it its distinctive experiential quality, and which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness. |
| **Problem of interaction, conceptual** | The objection to interactionist dualism that mind and body (or mental and physical properties) cannot interact causally, because they are too different in nature, e.g. the mind is outside space while the body is in space. |
| **Problem of interaction, empirical** | The objection to interactionist dualism that the claim that the mind or mental states causes changes to the body or physical states conflicts with scientific theory or evidence, e.g. that the total energy in the universe stays constant. |
| **Qualia** | Phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic and non-Intentional properties of mental states. |
| **Supervenience** | A relation between two types of property. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties, e.g. aesthetic properties supervene on physical properties if two paintings that have identical physical properties cannot have different aesthetic properties. |
| **Zombie, philosophical** | An exact physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness. It therefore has identical physical properties to the person (and identical functional properties, if these are fixed by physical properties), but different mental properties. |

**Substance Dualism**

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from indivisibility. (5)

Explain the response to Descartes’ divisibility argument that the mind is divisible. (5)

Explain the response to Descartes’ divisibility argument that not everything physical is divisible. (5)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability. (5)

Explain the response to Descartes’ conceivability argument that mind without the body is not conceivable. (5)

Explain the response to Descartes’ conceivability argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. (5)

Explain the response to Descartes’ conceivability argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (5)

Explain the conceptual interaction problem facing interactionist/substance dualism. (5)

Explain the empirical interaction problem facing interactionist/substance dualism. (5)

Explain the difference between substance dualism and property dualism. (5)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from indivisibility **and** the response that the mind is in fact in divisible. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from indivisibility **and** the response that not everything physical is divisible. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability **and** the response that the mind without the body is not conceivable. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability **and** the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability **and** the response that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (12)

Compare and contrast substance dualism and property dualism. (12)

How convincing is substance dualism as an account of the mind. (25)

**Property Dualism**

Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism. (5)

Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism. (5)

Explain the problem of other minds for property dualism. (5)

Explain Ryle’s argument that property dualism makes a category mistake. (5)

Explain the challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism posed by the causal relationships between mental states and the physical. (5) OBJECTION 1 on SLIDE 40

Explain the challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism posed by introspective self-knowledge. (5)

Explain the challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism posed by natural selection/evolution. (5)

Explain Ryle’s claim that dualism makes a category mistake. (5)

Explain the difference between substance dualism and property dualism. (5)

Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism **and** the response that zombies are not conceivable. (12)

Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism **and** the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. (12)

Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism **and** the response that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (12)

Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism **and** the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge. (12)

Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism **and** the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge. (12)

Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism **and** the response that Mary does gain new propositional knowledge but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way. (12)

Explain the problem of other minds for property dualism **and** the argument from analogy in response. (12)

Explain the problem of other minds for property dualism **and** the response that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis. (12)

How convincing is property dualism as an account of mental states? (25)

**Philosophical Behaviourism**

Explain Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism. (5)

Explain Ryle’s ‘soft’ behaviourism. (5)

Explain the objection to behaviourism that mental states and behaviour are distinct. (5)

Explain Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ objection to behaviourism. (5)

Explain the ‘perfect actor’ objection to behaviourism. (5)

Explain the objection that behaviourism’s definitions of mental states are circular. (5)

Explain the objection to behaviourism that mental states are multiply realisable. (5)

Explain the issue that behaviourism has with the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. (5)

Compare and contrast Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism with Ryle’s ‘soft’ behaviourism (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the objection that mental states and behaviour are distinct. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ objection. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the ‘perfect actor’ objection. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the objection that behaviourism’s definitions of mental states are circular. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the objection to behaviourism that mental states are multiply realisable. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the issue that behaviourism has with the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. (12)

How convincing is philosophical behaviourism as an account of mental states? (25)

**Type identity theory**

Explain the type-identity theory view of mental states. (5)

Explain why the multiple realisability of mental states causes an issue for type-identity theory. (5)

**Eliminative materialism**

Explain the eliminative materialist view of mental states. (5)

Explain why eliminative materialist believe our folk psychology understanding of the mind is radically mistaken. (5)

Explain eliminative materialism **and** the issue that our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations. (12)

Explain eliminative materialism **and** the objection thatfolk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power and so is the best hypothesis. (12)

Explain eliminative materialism **and** the objection that the theory is self-refuting. (12)

How convincing is eliminative materialism as an account of mental states? (25)

**Functionalism**

Explain the functionalist theory of mental states. (5)

Explain why a functional duplicate with different qualia causes an issue for functionalism. (5)

Explain why inverted qualia causes an issue for functionalism. (5)

Explain Ned Block’s ‘China’ objection to functionalism. (5)

Explain the functionalist theory of mental states **and** why a functional duplicate with different qualia causes an issue for functionalism. (12)

Explain the functionalist theory of mental states **and** the objection of inverted qualia. (12)

Explain the functionalist theory of mental states **and** Ned Block’s ‘China’ objection. (12)

How convincing is functionalism as an account of mental states? (25)