**Metaphysics of Mind Exam Questions**

These are the terms that are likely to be asked about in a 3 mark question.

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| **Behaviourism, hard (Hempel)** | The view that statements containing mental concepts can be reduced or translated into statements about behaviour and physical states containing no mental concepts, only physical ones. |
| **Behaviourism, soft****(Ryle)** | The view that talk of the mind is talk of how someone does or would behave under certain conditions. However, behavioural dispositions are not reducible to a finite set of statements about how someone would behave. |
| **Category mistake** | Treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it doesn’t belong to, e.g. 'this number is heavy' commits a category mistake as numbers are not the sorts of things that can have a weight. |
| **Conceivable** | Capable of being imagined or grasped mentally without incoherence or contradiction. |
| **Consciousness** | The subjective phenomenon of awareness of the world and/or of one's mental states.  |
| **Disposition** | How someone will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances: what they would do, could do, or are liable to do, in particular situations or under particular conditions, including conditions that they are not in at the moment. For example, someone who has a friendly disposition tends to smile when they are smiled at. |
| **Dualism, property** | The theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically fundamental kinds of property - mental properties and physical properties. |
| **Dualism, substance** | The theory that two kinds of substance exist, mental and physical substance. |
| **Elimination** | Ceasing to use a concept on the grounds that what it refers does not exist, e.g. the idea of ‘caloric fluid’ was eliminated by a new theory of heat in molecular motion. |
| **Eliminative materialism** | The theory that at least some of our basic mental concepts, such as consciousness or Intentionality, are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they don’t refer to anything that exists. |
| **Epiphenomenalism** | The theory that mental states and events are epiphenomena, by-products, the effects of some physical process, but with no causal influence of their own. Often combined with property dualism. |
| **Folk psychology** | A body of knowledge or theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people's behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse, e.g. 'if someone is thirsty, they will normally try to find something to drink'. |
| **Function** | A mapping from each of the possible inputs to some state to its output. The description of a state's function describes what that state does. |
| **Functionalism** | The theory that mental states are (can be reduced to) functional states, i.e. what it is to be a mental state is just to be a state with certain input and output relations to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states. |
| **Intentionality** | The property of mental states whereby they are ‘directed’ towards an ‘object’, that is they are 'about' something, e.g. the belief that Paris is the capital of France is about Paris and the desire to eat chocolate is about chocolate. |
| **Introspection** | Direct, first-personal awareness of one's own mental states. |
| **Inverted qualia** | The thought experiment that supposes that two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways, e.g. they both call the object 'red'. The argument is presented as an objection to a functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness. |
| **Machine table** | A table listing every possible combination of input and output for a machine, describing the operations of its software. |
| **Materialism** | The theory that the only substance is matter (or physical substance). Everything that exists, including the mind, depends on matter (physical substance) to exist. |
| **Mental states** | Mental phenomena that can endure over time, such as beliefs and desires. The term is sometimes used more broadly to cover mental phenomena or mental properties in general (states, processes and events). |
| **Multiple realisability** | 1) The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions. 2) The claim that one and the same mental state can have its function performed by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states. |
| **Ontologically distinct** | Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other, and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other, e.g. substance dualists claim that mind and body are ontologically distinct substances. |
| **Phenomenal consciousness** | A form of consciousness with a subjective experiential quality, as involved in perception, sensation, and emotion. Awareness of 'what it is like' to experience such mental phenomena. |
| **Phenomenal properties** | Properties of an experience that give it its distinctive experiential quality, and which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness. |
| **Problem of interaction, conceptual** | The objection to interactionist dualism that mind and body (or mental and physical properties) cannot interact causally, because they are too different in nature, e.g. the mind is outside space while the body is in space. |
| **Problem of interaction, empirical** | The objection to interactionist dualism that the claim that the mind or mental states causes changes to the body or physical states conflicts with scientific theory or evidence, e.g. that the total energy in the universe stays constant. |
| **Qualia** | Phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic and non-Intentional properties of mental states. |
| **Supervenience** | A relation between two types of property. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties, e.g. aesthetic properties supervene on physical properties if two paintings that have identical physical properties cannot have different aesthetic properties. |
| **Zombie, philosophical** | An exact physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness. It therefore has identical physical properties to the person (and identical functional properties, if these are fixed by physical properties), but different mental properties. |

**Substance Dualism**

**Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from indivisibility. (5)**

Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from indivisibility claims that the mind and body must be separate substances because they possess fundamentally different properties. Specifically, he argues that the body is divisible, whereas the mind is indivisible. Leibniz’s law of identity states that if two entities are identical if and only if they have all the same properties. When applied to mind and body therefore, if they can be shown to have different properties, they are different things.

Descartes observes that physical substances, such as the body, can be divided into parts. For example, a limb can be cut off, and organs can be removed or separated. This suggests that the body is extended in space and composed of divisible matter. In contrast, Descartes argues that the mind is entirely indivisible. He claims that we cannot divide thoughts, consciousness, or self-awareness into separate parts in the same way we can divide physical objects. Even though people may experience conflicting emotions or thoughts, Descartes insists that the self remains unified and cannot be split into separate components like a material substance.

Since divisibility is an essential property of physical things, and indivisibility is an essential property of mental things, Descartes concludes that the mind and body must be fundamentally different substances. This leads to substance dualism, the belief that the mind is a non-physical, thinking substance, while the body is a physical, extended substance.

**Explain the response to Descartes’ divisibility argument that the mind is divisible. (5)**

Descartes argues for substance dualism by arguing that since the physical body is divisible whereas the mind is not, they must be distinct substances. This can be responded to by pointing to modern neuroscience, which shows that brain damage can affect specific mental functions. For example, conditions like split-brain syndrome can lead to a division in conscious awareness, where the two hemispheres of the brain process information independently. This suggests that mental functions can be divided, undermining Descartes' claim that the mind is indivisible. Additionally, psychological conditions such as dissociative identity disorder (DID) appear to show that a single mind can split into multiple distinct personalities, further suggesting that the mind is not an indivisible entity. Therefore, Descartes’ indivisibility argument is challenged by showing that mental functions can be divided, suggesting that the mind may not be a fundamentally separate substance from the body.

**Explain the response to Descartes’ divisibility argument that not everything physical is divisible. (5)**

Descartes argues for substance dualism by arguing that since the physical body is divisible whereas the mind is not, they must be distinct substances. It can be objected to by arguing that in fact the physical is sometimes not divisible and therefore simply proving that the mind is not divisible would not prove that it is not physical. Descartes argues that extension is the essential property of physical objects but we can question whether this theory of physical objects is correct. If you cut something up, it seems that, in principle, you can you always cut it into smaller pieces. However, it is not certain that this is true; maybe there are physical things that cannot be divided even in principle. If, for example, the smallest physical particles are best understood as packets of energy or force fields, then we can’t further divide these, you can’t have half a force field. Or again, perhaps not only force fields but also processes or waves or something else that can’t be divided spatially form a fundamental part of the physical universe.

The implication of this is that it may not be an essential or defining property of every physical substance that it is divisible. There are some indivisible things, such as force fields, that are physical. In that case, the fact that the mind is not divisible does not entail that it is not physical. It could be a form of non-divisible physical thing. So even if Descartes is right that the mind isn’t divisible, this doesn’t prove that it isn’t physical.

**Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability. (5)**

Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability is based on the idea that the mind and body must be distinct substances because they can be conceived of as separate. Descartes argues that he can clearly and distinctly conceive of himself existing without his body. He claims that while he can doubt the existence of his physical body, he cannot doubt the existence of his mind because thinking is essential to his existence (*cogito, ergo sum* – "I think, therefore I am"). Since he can conceive of his mind existing without his body, it follows that the two must be separate substances.

He supports this claim using the principle of identity: if two things are identical, they must share all the same properties. However, the mind and body have different essential properties: the mind is a thinking, non-extended substance, while the body is an extended, non-thinking substance. Since they have different properties, they cannot be the same kind of thing. Descartes concludes that the mind and body must be separate substances, which forms the basis of substance dualism.

**Explain the response to Descartes’ conceivability argument that mind without the body is not conceivable. (5)**

Descartes’ conceivability argument claims that since we can conceive of mind as being distinct from the body, they must be separate substances. However, we can deny Descartes’ premise that we can conceive of mind as separate from body. Descartes may think that it is conceivable that mind and body are distinct substances when, in fact, it isn’t conceivable. He may be confused or simply lack relevant information. For example, philosophical behaviourism argues that the mind, mental states and events, should be analysed in terms of behaviour. To talk of beliefs, thoughts, desires, choices and so on is to talk of how something behaves. Now, without a body, something can’t exhibit behaviour; and without behaviour, there is no mind. If this theory is correct, then once we’ve understood what we mean when we talk about the mind, we will realise that mind without body is inconceivable. Other physicalist theories make similar claims, that conceiving mind without body is actually confused and it is not possible once you fully understand the nature of the mind. The general point is that we can make mistakes over what we think is conceivable. Without the premise that the mind can be conceived of as separate from the body, Descartes’ argument fails.

**Explain the response to Descartes’ conceivability argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. (5)**

Descartes’ conceivability argument claims that since we can conceive of mind as being distinct from the body, they must be separate substances. However, just because the mind can be conceived of as a separate substance from the body, it does not follow that it is metaphysically possible that they are distinct. Just because we think we can conceive of the mind existing separately does not mean it can actually exist separately in reality because what seems conceivable is not always metaphysically possible. This is known as the masked man fallacy: mistakenly believing that two things are distinct simply because we conceive of them separately. For example, one might conceive of water as different from H₂O. It is not an analytic truth that water is H₂O as they are two different concepts. However, in reality, they are identical. We can now apply these ideas to Descartes’ argument. Descartes argues that it is possible for the mind to exist independently of the body, because he can conceive of it existing without the body. In other words, he argues that because it is logically (conceptually) possible for the mind to exist without the body, it is also metaphysically possible. But this doesn’t follow. Perhaps unknown to him, the mind is not an ontologically independent substance, and it is metaphysically impossible for it to exist separately from the body (just as it is metaphysically impossible for water to exist without H₂O).

**Explain the response to Descartes’ conceivability argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (5)**

Descartes’ conceivability argument claims that it is possible for the mind to exist independently of the body, because he can conceive of it existing without the body. In other words, he argues that because it is logically (conceptually) possible for the mind to exist without the body, it is also metaphysically possible. Even if this is all true, it can be argued that this does not prove that mind and the body are distinct substances in the actual world. For example, just as one can conceive of water as different from H₂O, they are, in reality, identical. It is therefore also metaphysically possible that the mind and body are actually different concepts of the same metaphysical reality. Therefore, even if Descartes’ conceivability arguments is sound, is only proves that it is metaphysically possible that mind and body are separate substances. It is equally metaphysically possible that thought (mind) and extension (body) are two properties of a single substance. What we need to know is which option is true in the actual world. Simply knowing what is metaphysically possible does not tell us which possibility correctly describes reality. So just because it is metaphysically possible for mind and body to be separate substances doesn’t show that they are separate substances.

**Explain the conceptual interaction problem facing interactionist/substance dualism. (5)**

The conceptual interaction problem challenges substance dualism, which is the view that the mind and body are distinct substances but can causally interact. This problem questions how a non-physical mind can influence a physical body and vice versa. Descartes claims that the mind is a non-extended thinking substance, while the body is an extended physical substance. However, for interaction to occur, the mind must be able to affect the body, such as when a mental decision (e.g., choosing to raise an arm) leads to a physical action. The issue is that physical interactions require a transfer of energy or force, yet a non-physical mind has no physical properties to exert such force. This makes the interaction between mind and body conceptually mysterious. If the mind has no spatial presence, then it seems impossible for it to exert any causal influence on the body.

This is a serious challenge to interactionist substance dualism, as it suggests that the mind and body cannot causally interact without violating fundamental and logical principles, therefore making it a poor explanation of the relationship between mind and body.

**Explain the empirical interaction problem facing interactionist/substance dualism. (5)**

Substance dualism claims that the mind and body are distinct substances that interact with one another. The empirical interaction problem arises because interactionist dualism appears to violate the laws of physics. For example, the law of the conservation of energy states that in any closed system, the total amount of energy remains unchanged. Energy can only change forms, for example, movement can produce heat. A closed system is defined as one that does not interact with anything outside itself. The universe is typically understood as a closed system, since there is nothing ‘outside’ the universe that it can interact with. This means that the total amount of energy in the universe cannot change. If something in the universe, such as the human body, were to move without energy being transferred from another physical source, the law of the conservation of energy would not hold true for the universe. This creates a problem for interactionist dualism, which claims that a non-physical mind can cause movement in the physical body. If the mind were able to do this, it would imply an increase in energy in the universe without a corresponding physical cause. Therefore, either our understanding of the laws of physics is incorrect or, as seems more likely, interactionist substance dualism is false.

A second empirical challenge presents another difficulty for interactionist dualism. Current scientific evidence strongly indicates that bodily movements are caused by physical events in the brain. If the mind is responsible for moving the body, it must do so by interacting with and altering neural activity in the brain. This would require a non-physical entity to intervene in physical brain processes, contradicting both neuroscience and the fundamental laws of physics. Unless our understanding of neuroscience and the laws of physics is seriously flawed, substance dualism must be false.

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from indivisibility **and** the response that the mind is in fact in divisible. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from indivisibility **and** the response that not everything physical is divisible. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability **and** the response that the mind without the body is not conceivable. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability **and** the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. (12)

Explain Descartes’ argument for substance dualism from conceivability **and** the response that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (12)

Compare and contrast substance dualism and property dualism. (12)

How convincing is substance dualism as an account of the mind. (25)

**Property Dualism**

**Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism. (5)**

The philosophical zombies argument is a thought experiment used to support property dualism which is the view that that the mind is a set of irreducible properties of the brain. A philosophical zombie is a being that is physically and functionally identical to a normal human but lacks conscious experience (qualia). It behaves in exactly the same way as a normal human: it speaks, reacts to stimuli, and even claims to be conscious, but it has no inner subjective experience. For example, if a zombie were burned, it would scream and withdraw its hand, but it would not actually feel pain.

The argument makes the case that if philosophical zombies are conceivable, then it must be metaphysically possible that consciousness is separate from physical brain states. This suggests that mental properties, such as qualia, cannot be reduced to physical properties, supporting property dualism. If consciousness were purely physical, then philosophical zombies should be impossible, yet the fact that we can conceive of them suggests that consciousness must be something more than just brain activity. Therefore, the philosophical zombies argument supports the claim that consciousness is an irreducible property of the brain that cannot be explained purely in physical terms.

**Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism and the response that zombies are not conceivable. (12)**

*[Philosophical zombies 5 marker]*

One key response to this argument is the claim that philosophical zombies are not actually conceivable. Critics argue that while it may seem as though we can imagine a being physically identical to a human but lacking consciousness, this does not mean such a being is truly possible. If consciousness is necessarily tied to physical processes, it would mean that if a being is physically identical to a human, it must also have the same conscious experiences. In other words, the very idea of a philosophical zombie is incoherent because consciousness cannot be separated from the physical brain states that give rise to it.

**Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism and the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. (12)**

*[Philosophical zombies 5 marker]*

This argument can be challenged by attacking the claim that what is conceivable is necessarily metaphysically possible. Just because we can imagine or conceive of a scenario does not mean that it could exist in reality. One reason for this is that our intuitions about conceivability can be misleading. For example, at one time, it is conceivable that water could be something other than H₂O. If somebody does not know the chemical formula for water, they could imagine that it was something other than H₂O. However, it does not therefore follow that it is metaphysically possible that water is not H₂O. Similarly, just because we can conceive of philosophical zombies, it does not follow that zombies are metaphysically possible, they might still be impossible due to hidden constraints in the nature of reality. If consciousness necessarily arises from certain physical structures, then a zombie world, one in which beings are physically identical to humans but lack consciousness, would not be genuinely possible.

**Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism and the response that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (12)**

*[Philosophical zombies 5 marker]*

However, even if this is all true, it can be argued that this does not prove that philosophical zombies are possible in the actual world. For example, just as one can conceive of water as different from H₂O, they are, in reality, identical. It is therefore also metaphysically possible that the mind and body are actually different concepts of the same metaphysical reality. Therefore, even if the philosophical zombies argument is sound, it only proves that it is metaphysically possible that mind and body are separate substances. It is equally metaphysically possible that thought mind and body are two properties of a single substance. What we need to know is which option is true in the actual world. Simply knowing what is metaphysically possible does not tell us which possibility correctly describes reality. So just because it is metaphysically possible for mind and body to be separate substances doesn’t show that they are separate substances.

**Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism. (5)**

The knowledge argument supports property dualism which is the view that that the mind is a set of irreducible properties of the brain. It argues that consciousness involves non-physical properties (qualia) that cannot be fully explained in physical terms. The thought experiment describes Mary, a brilliant scientist who has spent her entire life in a black-and-white room, learning everything there is to know about the physics and biology of colour vision. She understands the wavelengths of light, the functioning of the eye, and the neural processes involved in seeing colour. However, when Mary leaves the room and experiences colour for the first time, she learns something new: what it is like to see red. If Mary gains new knowledge upon seeing colour, then not all knowledge is physical knowledge. This suggests that qualia (subjective experiences) cannot be reduced to physical processes. If consciousness were purely physical, then Mary should have already known everything about colour vision before leaving the room because she already knew all the physical facts. If she learns something new then, this suggests that consciousness involves more than just physical facts.

This argument therefore supports property dualism, the view that mental properties are distinct from, but dependent on, physical processes.

**Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism and the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge. (12)**

*[Explain the Mary argument]*

A key objection is that, while it is true that Mary learns something new, she does not gain new propositional knowledge, but rather ability knowledge: Mary does not learn a new fact, but acquires a new skill. By analogy, if someone knew all the physics of swimming but has never swum before. when they enter water for the first time, they learn how to swim. They do not gain a new fact about swimming they just develop a new ability. Similarly, Mary does not learn any new facts but gains a new ability. The experience of red allows her to form new associations and memories, but this does not mean she gains a new fact about the world, only that she gains the ability to recognize and recall red. Therefore, Mary’s newfound knowledge is just a change in her cognitive abilities which means that physicalism is not undermined. The brain could simply be gaining a new way of processing information rather than encountering something non-physical.

**Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism and the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge. (12)**

*[Explain the Mary argument]*

An objection to the argument is that Mary does not actually gain new propositional knowledge (factual information), but instead gains acquaintance knowledge (direct familiarity with an experience). Before Mary steps outside, she has all propositional knowledge about colour; she knows all the physical facts, but she does not have acquaintance knowledge of red. When she sees red for the first time, she becomes acquainted with the experience of red, but this is not the same as learning a new fact. In other words, she gains direct familiarity with the experience, not new information about colour. This distinction can be further clarified with an example. Suppose someone knows everything about a celebrity from books and articles (propositional knowledge), but when they meet the celebrity in person, they gain acquaintance knowledge: direct familiarity with the person. This does not mean they learn new facts about the celebrity, they simply experience the person directly. Similarly, Mary’s experience of seeing red is about gaining direct familiarity with the experience of colour, not acquiring new factual knowledge. If Mary’s newfound knowledge is just acquaintance with a different way of processing the same physical information, then there is no need to resort to property dualism to explain what Mary learns. Therefore, the knowledge/Mary argument does not necessarily undermine physicalism, as it can be understood in terms of acquaintance knowledge rather than new propositional knowledge.

**Explain the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism and the response that Mary does gain new propositional knowledge but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way. (12)**

*[Explain the Mary argument]*

A response to this argument distinguishes between two ways we might talk about ‘facts’ on the basis of the distinction between concepts and properties. If I know that there is water in a glass, I do not necessarily know that there is H2O in the glass. Someone may know one of these facts without knowing the other, as they may have the concept of WATER without understanding it as H2O. In this sense, knowing water in the glass and knowing H2O in the glass are two different facts, as they rely on different concepts. However, in another sense, the fact that there is water in the glass is identical to the fact that there is H2O in the glass because water and H2O are the same substance. Both statements refer to the same reality, and in this sense, facts are understood by how the world is, not by how we think about it. We can apply this to the knowledge argument. Before leaving her room, Mary understands red in physical terms, such as light wavelengths or brain activity. This is her theoretical concept of red. However, she lacks the phenomenal concept of red, which she gains only by experiencing red. When Mary sees red for the first time, she acquires this new phenomenal concept and can think about red in terms of her experience. While she gains new propositional knowledge, her new concept refers to the same physical property she already knew about. While Mary gains knowledge of a new "fact" in the sense of acquiring a new concept, this doesn’t mean she learns about a new property in the world and so does not undermine the physicalist position because the argument does not show that there are non-physical facts to be known.

**Explain the problem of other minds for property dualism. (5)**

The problem of other minds raises doubts about how we can know that other people have conscious experiences (qualia) if mental properties are non-physical. Property dualism holds that while the brain is a physical substance, consciousness consists of non-physical properties that cannot be reduced to physical processes. This means that mental states are private and directly accessible only to the individual experiencing them. Unlike physical properties, which can be observed objectively, qualia (subjective experiences) cannot be directly observed in others. This leads to a sceptical problem: if we can only directly observe our own consciousness, how can we be certain that other minds exist at all? For example, we assume that others feel pain when they react to injury, but if consciousness is a separate, irreducible property, there is no way to verify directly that others experience pain as we do. This problem is particularly difficult for property dualism because it claims that consciousness is non-physical. Since we can only infer the existence of other minds from behaviour rather than direct observation, there is no way to empirically confirm that others are conscious. Therefore, the problem of other minds poses a serious challenge to property dualism, as it suggests that if mental properties are non-physical and private, we can never truly know whether other conscious beings exist.

**Explain Ryle’s argument that property dualism makes a category mistake. (5)**

Ryle argues that property dualism makes a category mistake, meaning that it misunderstands the nature of mental states by treating them as a separate type of property. A category mistake occurs when something is mistakenly placed in the wrong logical category. Ryle illustrates this with the university example: If a visitor is shown various buildings: libraries, lecture halls, and offices, but then asks, "Where is the university*?"*, they are making a category mistake by assuming that the university is a separate entity rather than the sum of its parts. Ryle applies this idea to property dualism, which claims that while the brain is a physical substance, consciousness consists of non-physical properties. Ryle argues that this is a misclassification of mental states. Just as ‘the university’ is not a separate object beyond its buildings, mental states are not separate, non-physical properties but simply ways of describing certain kinds of physical processes in the brain. By claiming that consciousness is a distinct, irreducible property, property dualism treats mental states as if they belong to a separate category from physical states, when in fact, they may simply be different ways of talking about brain activity.

**Explain the challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism posed by the causal relationships between mental states and the physical. (5)**

Epiphenomenalist dualism is the view that mental states are caused by physical brain states but do not themselves cause anything. This means that thoughts, feelings, and experiences are mere byproducts of physical processes in the brain. The issue with this is that mental states seem to influence physical states. For example, pain appears to cause someone to withdraw their hand from a hot stove, and the intention to speak seems to result in actual speech. If epiphenomenalism were true, then mental states (like pain or intention) would have no causal power, meaning our conscious experiences would play no role in guiding behaviour. This contradicts our everyday experience, where we assume that our thoughts, desires, and intentions affect our actions.

Additionally, the causal interaction between mental and physical states is well-supported by neuroscience. Studies suggest that mental events correlate with and influence brain activity, which then produces behaviour. For example, deciding to raise a hand activates neural processes that lead to the movement. If mental states truly had no causal power, it would be unclear why they are so closely linked to the brain’s activity.

Therefore, mental states clearly appear to have causal effects on the physical world which contradicts the core claim of epiphenomenalist dualism: that mental states do not influence anything.

**Explain the challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism posed by introspective self-knowledge. (5)**

Epiphenomenalist dualism claims that mental states are produced by physical brain states but have no causal influence on anything, including other mental states or physical actions. This leads to a serious problem regarding introspective self-knowledge (our ability to know our own thoughts and experiences). The challenge is that if mental states have no causal power, then our awareness of them would not be caused by the mental state. When someone says, "I am in pain" or "I feel happy," they are expressing knowledge of their own mental state. However, for this to happen, their awareness of the pain must cause their belief that they are in pain. This contradicts epiphenomenalism, since it denies that mental states can cause anything. If epiphenomenalism were true, then our reports of our own experiences would have to be caused purely by physical processes in the brain, rather than by our actual conscious awareness. This would mean that we do not truly "know" our own mental states, but instead, our brains just happen to produce verbal or behavioural responses that correlate with those states. This is deeply counterintuitive, as it denies the direct, first-person access we seem to have to our own thoughts and experiences.

**Explain the challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism posed by natural selection/evolution. (5)**

Epiphenomenalist dualism claims that mental states are caused by physical processes in the brain but do not themselves cause any physical effects. This view presents a challenge when considered in the context of natural selection and evolution. Evolution by natural selection favours traits that enhance an organism’s survival and reproductive success. If consciousness and mental states had no causal impact on behaviour, as epiphenomenalism suggests, it would be difficult to explain why they evolved at all. If epiphenomenalism were true, mental states like pain, fear, and decision-making would not influence an organism’s actions, meaning there would be no evolutionary advantage to their existence. Therefore they would not be selected for and would not evolve. However, in reality, it seems that mental states do have a role in guiding behaviour. For example, pain causes avoidance of harm, and fear promotes self-preservation. This suggests that mental states must have causal power, contradicting epiphenomenalism. Therefore, the challenge from evolution implies that mental states must be more than just by-products of physical processes; they must play a functional role in an organism’s survival and adaptation, undermining the claims of epiphenomenalist dualism.

**Explain the difference between substance dualism and property dualism. (5)**

Substance dualism and property dualism are two different views about the relationship between the mind and the body. Substance dualism, holds that the mind and body are two fundamentally different substances: the mind is a non-physical substance, while the body is a physical substance.

In contrast, property dualism holds that there is only one kind of substance, the physical, but that this substance has both physical and mental properties. This means that mental states, such as consciousness and sensations, are not separate substances but are instead non-physical properties that emerge from physical processes in the brain. Unlike substance dualism, property dualism does

not claim that the mind can exist separately from the body.

The key difference is that substance dualism sees the mind as a distinct, non-physical entity, while property dualism sees mental states as dependent on the physical brain but still possessing unique, irreducible qualities.

**Explain the problem of other minds for property dualism and the argument from analogy in response. (12)**

*[Problem of other minds 5 marker]*

Descartes' argument from analogy in response to the problem of other minds suggests that we can infer the existence of other minds based on similarities between our own mental states and the observable behaviour of others. Descartes argues that, just as we know our own mind through introspection and the experiences we have, we can reasonably assume that other people also have minds based on their outward behaviour and expressions. For example, if we observe someone laughing when hearing a joke, we infer that they are experiencing a mental state similar to our own (such as amusement or happiness). Since we know that our own laughter is tied to such mental states, it is reasonable to assume that others' behaviour has the same cause. In this way, we use the analogy of our own experiences to infer that other humans possess minds and mental states like our own, despite not having direct access to their inner experiences. Descartes' argument relies on the idea that, while we cannot directly observe the minds of others, the similarities between their behaviour and our own mental processes provide a strong basis for inferring the existence of their minds.

**Explain the problem of other minds for property dualism and the response that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis. (12)**

*[Problem of other minds 5 marker]*

One response to this challenge is that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis to explain the behaviour we observe in others. This response suggests that, just as we infer the presence of mental states in ourselves from our own experiences and behaviour, the best explanation for the complex behaviours of others is that they, too, have minds and mental states. For example, if we observe someone responding to stimuli in similar ways that we would (e.g., pulling away from something hot), it is reasonable to assume that they are experiencing similar sensations and feelings as we do. Although we cannot directly experience their mental states, the regularity and consistency of their behaviour in response to certain situations lead us to infer that they possess mental states.

This response can be supported by the argument that the behaviours we observe in others closely resemble the behaviours we would exhibit in the same circumstances. It is highly unlikely that complex behaviours, such as speaking, laughing, or reacting to pain, are entirely unrelated to the internal mental states of others. Rather, it is reasonable to infer that others have similar experiences of pain, joy, or thought, because their behaviour is systematically similar to ours in situations that we know are associated with particular mental states. This view allows property dualists to account for the existence of other minds, even though the nature of their mental states remains inaccessible to direct observation.

How convincing is property dualism as an account of mental states? (25)

**Philosophical Behaviourism**

**Explain Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism. (5)**

Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism is the view that all meaningful psychological statements can be translated into statements about observable behaviour. Hempel argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, should not be understood as inner, private experiences but rather in terms of publicly verifiable behavioural dispositions. What we are talking about, therefore, when we are talking about the mind and mental states is behaviour: what people do and how they react. On this view, the mind is not a ‘thing’. This is not to say that the mind does not exist, it claims that talk of mental states and talk of behaviour are conceptually identical, we are saying the same thing in both cases. For example, to say that someone is in pain is simply to say that they exhibit pain-related behaviours, such as wincing, crying out, or seeking relief. Hempel’s behaviourism is ‘hard’ because it rejects any reference to internal mental states that cannot be empirically observed and that all mental states can be directly translated to specific behaviours.

**Explain Ryle’s ‘soft’ behaviourism. (5)**

Behaviourism is the philosophical view that all meaningful psychological statements can be translated into statements about observable behaviour rather than inner, subjective experiences. It rejects the idea that the mind is a separate, non-physical entity and instead argues that talking about mental states is simply a way of describing how people behave or are likely to behave.

Ryle’s ‘soft’ behaviourism is a more flexible version of this view. Unlike Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism, which attempts to reduce all mental concepts to specific behavioural patterns, Ryle acknowledges that mental states cannot be strictly equated with particular behaviours. For example, the mental state of pain cannot simply be understood as exhibiting pain-related behaviours such as wincing, crying out, or seeking relief, as this is too simplistic. A person might, for instance, suppress such behaviours to appear brave in front of others while still experiencing pain. To account for this, Ryle understands mental states not just in terms of actual behaviour but also in terms of behavioural dispositions: tendencies to behave in particular ways under certain conditions. This means that even if someone is not currently exhibiting pain-related behaviours, we can still say they are in pain because they would display those behaviours in a different context. Mental states, therefore, are always understood in terms of behaviours, but rather than requiring a strict one-to-one correlation between mental states and physical actions, Ryle treats mental concepts as descriptions of behavioural tendencies rather than references to hidden inner states.

**Explain the objection to behaviourism that mental states and behaviour are distinct. (5)**

*This is a general question that includes both of the next 2 questions: ‘Super Spartans and Perfect actor’*

**Explain Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ objection to behaviourism. (5)**

Behaviourism is the philosophical view that all meaningful psychological statements can be translated into statements about observable behaviour rather than inner, subjective experiences. It rejects the idea that the mind is a separate, non-physical entity and instead argues that talking about mental states is simply a way of describing how people behave or are likely to behave.

Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ objection challenges behaviourism by arguing that mental states cannot be reduced to behavioural dispositions. He imagines a community of ‘Super-Spartans’ who have been trained to suppress all outward signs of pain. Although they feel pain, they do not wince, groan, or display any typical pain-related behaviour, even under extreme circumstances.

This thought experiment undermines behaviourism because, according to the theory, pain is defined by the tendency to exhibit pain-related behaviour. However, the Super-Spartans clearly experience pain without any corresponding behaviour, suggesting that pain (and mental states more generally) cannot be equated with behavioural dispositions. This implies that mental states have an internal, subjective aspect that behaviourism fails to account for.

**Explain the ‘perfect actor’ objection to behaviourism. (5)**

Behaviourism is the philosophical view that all meaningful psychological statements can be translated into statements about observable behaviour rather than inner, subjective experiences. It rejects the idea that the mind is a separate, non-physical entity and instead argues that talking about mental states is simply a way of describing how people behave or are likely to behave.

The ‘perfect actor’ objection challenges behaviourism by arguing that mental states cannot be fully defined by outward behaviour. It suggests that a highly skilled actor could perfectly imitate the behaviour associated with a particular mental state, such as pain, fear, or happiness, without actually experiencing that state. For example, an actor might convincingly display all the external signs of pain, such as wincing, groaning, and clutching their body, while feeling nothing at all.

This objection undermines behaviourism because, according to the theory, mental states are just behavioural dispositions. However, the perfect actor demonstrates that behaviour can occur without the corresponding mental state. This implies that mental states are distinct from behaviour and cannot simply be reduced to it.

**Explain the objection that behaviourism’s definitions of mental states are circular. (5)**

Behaviourism is the philosophical view that all meaningful psychological statements can be translated into statements about observable behaviour rather than inner, subjective experiences. Ryle’s behaviourism understands mental states not just in terms of actual behaviour but also in terms of behavioural dispositions: tendencies to behave in particular ways under certain conditions

The problem with analysing mental states in this way is that the conditions that will determine behaviours, very often depend on multiple other interacting mental states. For example, if a person is afraid of snakes, their response to seeing one depends on additional beliefs, such as whether they consider the snake dangerous or whether they think running away is the best course of action. Fear alone does not determine behaviour; it interacts with other mental states. This creates a circularity issue for behaviourism. Defining fear in terms of behaviour requires referring to other mental states, such as belief and recognition. Any attempt to analyse these states in behavioural terms will again rely on further mental states. Since behaviourism aims to explain mental states without assuming them, this circular dependence prevents it from providing a satisfactory analysis.

**Explain the objection to behaviourism that mental states are multiply realisable. (5)**

Behaviourism is the philosophical view that all meaningful psychological statements can be translated into statements about observable behaviour rather than inner, subjective experiences. It rejects the idea that the mind is a separate, non-physical entity and instead argues that talking about mental states is simply a way of describing how people behave or are likely to behave.

The objection from multiple realisability argues that behaviourism fails because the same mental state can be realised in different ways across different beings. For example, fear is not always expressed through the same behaviour: one person may run away but another may freeze and stay still. If behaviourism were correct, mental states would have to correspond to specific behavioural patterns, but the wide variety of possible behaviours for the same mental state suggests otherwise. Even if we accept that mental states do not have to correspond to specific behaviours but instead can be understood as dispositions to behaviour, this does not seem to solve the problem. It will be impossible to give a list of the conditions of verification for all the ways in which people might behave when afraid. The list will be infinitely long, especially if we have to specify all the different conditions under which people show fear. Therefore, behaviourism cannot give an adequate account of what our mental concepts mean.

Secondly, given that different people with the same mental state have dispositions to do different things in similar situations, it seems that behaviourism cannot say that people who have different dispositions have the same mental state. Since they do no share the same behavioural disposition, and mental states are behavioural dispositions, it cannot be the case that they share the same mental state.

For these two reasons, we can challenge behaviourism’s claim that mental states can be fully explained in terms of behaviour.

**Explain the issue that behaviourism has with the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. (5)**

Behaviourism is the philosophical view that all meaningful psychological statements can be translated into statements about observable behaviour rather than inner, subjective experiences. It rejects the idea that the mind is a separate, non-physical entity and instead argues that talking about mental states is simply a way of describing how people behave or are likely to behave.

However, this account struggles to explain the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others' mental states. We seem to have direct, privileged access to our own mental states through introspection, whereas we infer other people’s mental states from their behaviour. However, behaviourism claims that mental states just are behavioural dispositions, which implies that we should only know our own mental states by observing our own behaviour, just as we do with others. This contradicts the common-sense view that we have immediate self-knowledge, making behaviourism an inadequate account of the nature of mental states.

**Explain Ryle’s reply to the objection that there is an asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. (5)**

The objection Ryle is responding to is that we seem to have direct, privileged access to our own mental states through introspection, whereas we infer other people’s mental states from their behaviour. This contradicts the common-sense view that we have immediate self-knowledge, making behaviourism an inadequate account of the nature of mental states.

Ryle’s response is to argue that consciousness, understood as giving special self-knowledge through introspection, is a myth. He argues that self-knowledge and our knowledge of other minds is gained in the same way in each case: by paying attention. He explains that thoughts are merely internalised speech, and speech is very clearly a behaviour. There is no asymmetry here because knowing what you are thinking is not different in kind from knowing what someone else is thinking, since we can know just as directly what someone else thinks when they speak. The difference is that in our own case, we have more to evidence of our mental states because we are witness to our silent, inner speech, our thinking, and we do not have this evidence in the case of others’ thoughts. Introspection, then, is just attending to our own thoughts, not a unique perception of mental objects.

Compare and contrast Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism with Ryle’s ‘soft’ behaviourism (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the objection that mental states and behaviour are distinct. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ objection. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the ‘perfect actor’ objection. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the objection that behaviourism’s definitions of mental states are circular. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the objection to behaviourism that mental states are multiply realisable. (12)

Explain Hempel/Ryle’s ‘hard/soft’ behaviourism **and** the issue that behaviourism has with the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. (12)

How convincing is philosophical behaviourism as an account of mental states? (25)

**Type identity theory**

**Explain the type-identity theory view of mental states. (5)**

Type-identity theory is the view that mental states are identical to specific physical states in the brain. According to this theory, every type of mental state (such as pain, belief, or desire) corresponds to a specific type of brain state or neural process. This means that mental states are not separate from physical processes but are rather the same thing, just described in different terms. For example, the experience of pain is identical to a particular brain state, and whenever someone is in pain, their brain is in that specific state. Mental states and brain states may not seem the same, but that’s because we have different ways of knowing about these properties: through experience and through neuroscience. As we investigate the world through science, many things turn out to be something they don’t seem to be, e.g. solid objects are mostly empty space. We can hold the distinct concepts of water and H2O, but through empirical investigation, we discover that they are the same metaphysical thing. Similarly, type-identity theory therefore accepts that mental states and brain states are two different concepts but ontologically reduces them down to their physical nature in the brain.

**Explain why the multiple realisability of mental states causes an issue for type-identity theory. (5)**

Type-identity theory is the view that mental states are identical to specific physical states in the brain. Although mental states and brain states are two different concepts, type identity theory holds that they are metaphysically identical and so both are concepts of the physical properties of the brain.

The issue of multiple realisability challenges the type-identity theory because it suggests that mental states can be realised by different physical systems. According to the multiple realisability argument, a single mental state, such as pain, can be caused by different physical processes in different species or even in different individuals within the same species. For example, the brain state associated with pain in humans will be different from that in dogs, yet they could still experience pain. This undermines the type-identity theory’s claim that each mental state corresponds to a specific brain state, as it implies that the same mental state can be realised in multiple, physically distinct ways, which type-identity theory does not account for.

**Eliminative materialism**

**Explain the eliminative materialist view of mental states. (5)**

Eliminative materialism is the view that mental states, as commonly understood in folk psychology (e.g., beliefs, desires, and emotions), do not actually exist. Instead, these mental states are considered outdated and inaccurate concepts that will eventually be replaced by a more precise, scientifically grounded understanding of the brain and its processes. Eliminative materialists argue that our everyday mental language, based on folk psychology, is like many of the myths and misconceptions of earlier scientific paradigms. For example, in the 18th century, scientists believed heat was a type of fluid called ‘caloric fluid’ which was passed from hot things to cold things and this explained how hot things warmed other things up, the caloric fluid was passed from one thing to another. However, this was a poor explanation and it was replaced by our current understanding of kinetic molecular energy. The concept of caloric fluid was not integrated into our new theory, it was ‘eliminated’ in favour of a better one. Similarly, as neuroscience progresses, it will eliminate the need for concepts like "belief" and "desire," substituting them with more accurate explanations of brain function. In this view, mental states are not reducible to brain states: they are illusory and will ultimately be discarded as science advances.

**Explain why eliminative materialist believe our folk psychology understanding of the mind is radically mistaken. (5)**

According to eliminative materialism, folk psychology is an empirical theory, meaning it could turn out to be false. Just as other past scientific concepts have been discarded, the core ideas of folk psychology, such as beliefs and desires, may not correspond to anything real. Paul Churchland argues that there are three strong reasons to believe this will happen.

First, although folk psychology can be accurate in some circumstances at predicting behaviour, it is an inadequate theory because it fails to explain many aspects of mental life, including mental illness, intelligence, sleep, perception, and learning. Secondly, while neuroscience has made continuous progress in explaining cognition, folk psychology has remained largely unchanged since ancient Greece, suggesting it lacks explanatory power. Thirdly, folk psychology does not align with successful scientific theories, particularly due to the problem of Intentionality. Intentionality refers to the way thoughts are directed towards objects or propositions: for example, believing something about Paris or desiring chocolate. However, physical processes, such as digestion, do not have this quality; they are not ‘about’ anything. Since brain states are purely physical, it is difficult to see how they could possess Intentionality. This suggests that folk psychology’s reliance on beliefs and desires as explanatory tools is fundamentally flawed.

Therefore, Churchland concludes, because folk psychology is incompatible with empirical science, particularly neuroscience, we have good reason to abandon it in favour of a more scientifically grounded theory of the mind.

**Explain the objection to eliminative materialism that our certainty about the existence of our mental states should take priority over other considerations. (5)**

Eliminative materialism is the view that mental states, as commonly understood in folk psychology (e.g., beliefs, desires, and emotions), do not actually exist and these inaccurate concepts should be replaced by a more precise, scientifically grounded understanding of the brain and its processes.

One key objection to eliminative materialism is that our direct, first-person certainty about the existence of our mental states should take priority over any theoretical arguments against them. Eliminative materialists claim that concepts like beliefs, desires, and emotions are mistaken and should be abandoned. However, this is deeply counterintuitive because we have direct, and surely undeniable, awareness of our own mental states. For example, even if scientific theories suggest that beliefs and desires do not exist, this seems less certain than the immediate experience of having them. Nothing, it seems, could be more certain to me than the fact that I have mental states. So no argument for eliminativism could be strong enough to justify giving up such a belief. Therefore, eliminative materialism should be dismissed because it asks us to reject something so that is obviously true.

**Explain the objection to eliminativism that folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power and so is the best hypothesis. (5)**

Eliminative materialism is the view that mental states, as commonly understood in folk psychology (e.g., beliefs, desires, and emotions), do not actually exist and these inaccurate concepts should be replaced by a more precise, scientifically grounded understanding of the brain and its processes. However, we can respond that folk psychology is, far from being a poor theory of the mind, actually the best hypothesis we have and is better at explaining human behaviour than the neuroscience the eliminativism favours.

Eliminativism criticises folk psychology for failing to explain mental illness, sleep, and learning. However, this is unfair, as folk psychology is not meant to explain these but rather human behaviour, where it excels. Knowing someone’s beliefs and desires allows us to predict and explain their actions far better than neuroscience, which struggles to account for everyday decisions. Moreover, folk psychology has evolved, incorporating ideas like unconscious beliefs and situational influences, which have informed scientific psychology. Eliminating concepts like beliefs and desires would undermine much of psychology. While the Churchlands argue we should favour the most powerful explanatory theory, folk psychology remains indispensable for understanding human behaviour, making it unlikely that neuroscience will replace it.

**Explain the objection that eliminative materialism is self-refuting. (5)**

Eliminative materialism is the view that mental states, as commonly understood in folk psychology (e.g., beliefs, desires, and emotions), do not actually exist and these inaccurate concepts should be replaced by a more precise, scientifically grounded understanding of the brain and its processes.

However it can be argued that the theory contradicts itself by denying the existence of beliefs while relying on them to make its case. The eliminativist claim that folk psychology is an empirical theory that may be proven false, leading to the elimination of concepts like beliefs and desires. However, their arguments for eliminativism depend on the existence of beliefs, as they rely on reasoning, meaning, and truth, all of which presuppose that people have beliefs about these concepts. If eliminative materialism is correct and beliefs do not exist, then the theory itself cannot be meaningfully asserted, as it would lack the very foundations needed to present a reasoned argument. On this view, folk psychology turns out not to be an empirical theory (which might or might not be wrong), but a condition of intelligibility, a condition for thinking, reasoning, and making claims at all. Therefore, the concepts of the mind in folk psychology cannot be eliminated and therefore eliminativism should be rejected.

Explain eliminative materialism **and** the issue that our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations. (12)

Explain eliminative materialism **and** the objection thatfolk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power and so is the best hypothesis. (12)

Explain eliminative materialism **and** the objection that the theory is self-refuting. (12)

How convincing is eliminative materialism as an account of mental states? (25)

**Functionalism**

**Explain the functionalist theory of mental states. (5)**

Functionalism defines mental states in terms of their functional roles rather than their physical composition. According to this theory, a mental state is identified by what it does rather than what it is made of. What it is to be a mental state is just to be a state with certain typical causal relations to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states. Different mental states differ in their typical inputs and outputs. The mind is essentially a sophisticated machine which can be explained by a ‘machine table’, which lists conditional statements like ‘if the machine is in state S1 and receives input I1, it produces output O1 and moves to state S2’. For example, a drinks dispenser might respond to a 20p input by displaying ‘Insert 50p’ and transitioning to a new state. Similarly, mental states are machine table states. A mental state, such as pain or belief, is defined entirely by its functional role, its inputs, outputs. For example, pain is characterised by its causal relations to inputs (if bodily injury) and outputs (then wince, say "ouch" and enact other mental states e.g. such as the desire to relieve the pain). This desire will be its own set of functional roles which will produce certain outputs given particular inputs. This means that mental states do not depend on their physical nature, they can be realised in multiple ways, including in different biological or artificial systems, as long as they perform the same functional role.

**Explain why a functional duplicate with different qualia causes an issue for functionalism. (5)**

According to functionalism, mental states are defined by their functional roles: inputs, outputs, and interactions with other states. Therefore, two systems performing the same functions should be considered to have the same mental states. However, if two systems are functionally identical but have different qualia (subjective experiences), this undermines the idea that mental states are solely defined by their functional roles. Qualia, which is the qualitative, subjective aspects of experience, like what it feels like to see red or experience pain, do not seem to be accounted for by functionalism. If two functionally identical systems can have different qualia, it suggests that something beyond function is needed to fully explain mental states. For example, a philosophical zombie is a replica of a human being who behaves and interacts with the world in the same way a normal person would. However, the zombie has no phenomenal consciousness, it does not have any first person experience, it merely functions as if it did. If zombies are possible, then we can have a functional duplicate with different mental states which would mean that functionalism fails to capture the complete nature of consciousness.

**Explain why inverted qualia causes an issue for functionalism. (5)**

Inverted qualia refer to a hypothetical scenario where two individuals have their qualia inverted, meaning they experience the world in the same way functionally but with different subjective experiences. For example, if one person sees red and the other sees green when exposed to the same stimulus, but both behave identically in response to these stimuli i.e. they both identify the colour with the word ‘red’. In this case their functional states would be the same, yet their qualia would be different.

This presents a problem for functionalism because the theory holds that mental states are defined by their functional roles: inputs, outputs, and interactions with other states, rather than by the subjective quality of experiences (qualia). If two functionally identical systems can experience different qualia, it suggests that qualia cannot be fully explained by function alone. Functionalism fails to account for the qualitative, subjective nature of mental experiences, as it cannot distinguish between functionally identical systems with different qualia. Therefore, inverted qualia challenge the completeness of functionalism in explaining the full nature of consciousness.

**Explain Ned Block’s ‘China’ objection to functionalism. (5)**

Ned Block’s ‘China’ objection to functionalism challenges the idea that mental states can be fully explained by their functional roles. Block imagines a scenario in which the workings of the brain of person who has recently died could be replicated by giving each person in China a two way radio. Each person then would perform the role of a neuron in the brain. This massive system could then function in a way that mirrors the functional roles of a human mind, processing inputs, interacting with other states, and producing outputs. However, despite the functional replication of a mind, Block argues that it would not have consciousness or genuine mental states. Instead, it would just be a mechanical system processing messages without any subjective experience. There is nowhere within the system for consciousness to arise. This suggests that the functional structure alone does not produce the presence of mental states or consciousness and therefore functionalism is inadequate for giving a full account of the mind. Functionalism fails to account for the subjective nature of experience (qualia), as a system can be functionally equivalent to a mind but still lack consciousness, making functionalism an flawed theory of the mind.

Explain the functionalist theory of mental states **and** why a functional duplicate with different qualia causes an issue for functionalism. (12)

Explain the functionalist theory of mental states **and** the objection of inverted qualia. (12)

Explain the functionalist theory of mental states **and** Ned Block’s ‘China’ objection. (12)

How convincing is functionalism as an account of mental states? (25)